CIES Secretariat Florida International University 312 ZEB Miami, FL 33199
Number
151
Guest Editor: Dr. Robert V. Farrell, Associate Profesor, C&I, FIU
The Future of Comparative and International Education
Presented to the annual meeting of the Comparative and International Education Society
Charleston, South Carolina
March, 2009
Stephen P. Heyneman
Professor, International Education Policy
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee
s.heyneman@vanderbilt.edu
Background
Current debate in Japan over whether the word ‘international’ should be added to the title of Comparative Education is not unique to Japan. Debates over titles and content of Comparative Education have been typical since the beginning. Unlike mathematics or physics, Comparative Education is a ‘low consensus’ subject (Bigler, 1973; Braxton and Lowell, 1996). Philip Foster argues that Comparative Education is not a discipline at all but rather a social science application such as economics or sociology to the processes of education (Foster, 1985 a; 1985b). While acknowledging that there are many legitimate motives for studying comparative education – to better understand other cultures or to augment under-appreciated political points of view – these motives do not constitute an academic discipline. In a way, the current discussion in Japan, and addresses by recent CIES presidents, have continued along the same lines as the original differences in view two decades ago. This paper will attempt to summarize some of these differences. It will then describe what I believe is the main dilemma in our field, the resolution of which will help determine the future of Comparative Education.
History of Comparative Education Debates
Following cutbacks in Comparative Education faculty positions in the 1980s along with the growth in demand for comparative education information and analysis, my presidential address referred to our discipline as being alive and well at the periphery and dead in the center (Heyneman, 1993). Though taken as controversial, it was simply parallel to what Foster had earlier argued when he pointed out that the bulk of those who practice comparative education do not hold that it is a discipline at all, but rather a part of the sociology of education or economics of education and the like (Foster, 1985, p. 5087). But apparently my comment set off a series of presidential rebuttals, first by Wilson (1994), then by Arnove (2001) and finally by Biramaiah, (2003). Wilson suggested that I may have ignored the rise of a new hybrid of academic practitioner in comparative education, one with on ground experience such as the Peace Corps who uses that experience to promote positive social change. Were I to have replied to Wilson, I might have pointed out my own experience in the Peace Corps and efforts to promote social change wherever I have worked, whether in NGOs, profit-making consultant firms, UN Agencies or universities. In fact, the category of comparative educator which Wilson thinks I left out, could have been myself.
Arnove points out that there are three different categories of comparative education specialists: those who promote a theoretical dimension; those who promote an ameliorative dimension; and those who promote an international global dimension, such as world peace (Arnove, 2001). Were I to have replied, I would have pointed out the similarity in categories two and three in terms of motive and the fact that some individuals can be in all three categories. I might also have raised Foster’s original point on whether an explicit political agenda is a legitimate part of an academic discipline.
Of course one reply to this point about explicit political agendas might be to ask whether there are any neutral disciplines or investigators. Foster’s reply reiterated that no epistemological or methodological stance can tell us what ought to be done in terms of policy. He would argue that alternative paradigms and differing methodological approaches should coexist but that toleration for multiple approaches means putting them in critical dialogue with one another, rather than a “flabby intellectual relativism in which it is conceived that all roads lead to an intellectual Rome.” Foster would distinguish science from ideology. Science he would say is an intellectually open system; ideology is an intellectually closed system (Foster, 1983.p.35).
On the other hand, some Marxists might reply to this by saying that they have a duty to promote an alternative to the current distribution of power. Foster would reply that these ideas are not unique to Marx; that they were expressed more persuasively by sociologists such as Weber (Foster, 1981); and that theories which begin as reasonable often turn into gross ideologies. For instance, he argues that structural functionalism and neo-Marxism ‘constitute sociological cul-de-sacs’; that ‘they are couched at such a general level that they are singularly unhelpful…’ Both, he says, are unilinear. Both constitute a set of propositions which are acceptable but ‘hardly helpful,’ while their theses are ‘largely spurious.’ ‘Whereas functionalists stress the operation of the market with all its consequences of differentiation, conflict theorists tend to concentrate on market imperfections.’ Foster would conclude that ‘we would do well to abandon the rhetoric altogether’ (Foster, 1977; Heyneman and Lykins, 2008).
When Foster became president of CIES, he used his presidential speech to address the views of those who wish to essentially do away with formal schooling including Ivan Ilich and Evertt Reimer. He made three points. He agreed that schools are inherently inegalitarian and subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor. But he pointed out that this is not the whole story for it fails to distinguish individual from aggregate benefits, implying that there are multiple benefits to society even if the doctors and scientists derive from elite social backgrounds. He also agreed that schools are agencies of mass conformity, which coerce children, restrict creativity and induce passivity, but he points out that all institutions man has created have a coercive component. That, he said, is the meaning of legitimate authority. To suggest that schools are an agency of conformity is ‘platitudinous.’ Lastly, the alternative to schools is never laid out in detail by the ‘deschoolers.’ Foster suggests that were deschoolers in charge they would merely substitute the inequalities of schools for a system of differentiation which ‘would itself be even more invidious’ (Foster, 1971).
Several neo-Marxist commentators criticized Foster’s views. In his reply he pointed out that tackling problems through revolutionary action treats all other reforms as though they were only tinkering social engineering and were doomed to failure. In contrast, Foster suggests that it is perfectly possible that a measure of social development can be achieved through pragmatic means. He suggests that Martin Carnoy believes in freedom only so long as the choices people make agree with his own value orientations. Carnoy’s idea of ‘false consciousness’ really means that people don’t agree with him (Foster, 1975).
The Future of Comparative and International Education
Stephen Heyneman
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